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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Until recently, the collective response of theinternational community to the threat ofinternational terrorism has been limited and
largely ineffective. Individual states have regarded
terrorism as either an internal security issue, or have
responded by using force against other states believed to be
responsible for harbouring or supporting terrorists.
Coercive strategies to combat international terrorism are
almost always controversial, and there is frequently an
element of doubt as to whether such actions are lawful.
Having said this, it is not an easy task to identify strategic
alternatives to the use of force in the fight against
international terrorism before the mid 1990’s. Political
initiatives were few and far between. Peaceful strategies
using the institutions and instruments of international law
were visible, but of doubtful efficacy.
The lack of any coherent non-coercive international
strategy to combat terrorism can be attributed to two
factors. First, the paralysis of the international law making
community during the Cold War. Secondly, armed
struggles for national liberation in the developing world led
to an ideological conflict between North and South over
the legitimacy of independence movements, and the tactics
they employed. These two factors inhibited the emergence
of any shared concept of what terrorism meant, or who the
terrorists were.
Despite these difficulties, the international community
had made some effort to respond peacefully to the threat
of terrorism. The first of a series of international
conventions that sought to encourage international co-
operation to deal with aircraft hi-jackings was concluded in
1963. This limited treaty making activity, which addressed
specific terrorist acts whilst avoiding the need to agree
upon a definition of terrorism, continued throughout the
Cold War.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, and as the ideological
conflicts of the national liberation era were replaced with
more contemporary concerns, the obstacles to developing
an effective and peaceful international response to counter
terrorist activity began to fall away.
International lawmakers, already well versed in the
intrumentalities of combating drug dealers and organised
crime, saw advantages in using anti money laundering and
anti-racketeering techniques developed by the law
enforcement community in their fight against terrorism.
Terrorist activity was increasingly regarded as being both an
international crime, and linked to other kinds of criminal
activity. Agreed definitions of terrorism, previously
exclusive to domestic law, began to emerge from
international institutions.
This article examines the record of international and
regional law makers and the programme of the Financial
Action Task Force both pre and post September 11. It will
demonstrate that innovative criminal justice strategies
previously used to attack the profits of criminal cartels are
now an essential part of the international community’s
collective response to international terrorism. It concludes
that although valuable, such strategies possess serious
shortcomings, and should not be the only peaceful
response deployed in the “war against terror”.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE PRE
SEPTEMBER 11
Although the term terrorism has been part of our
political vocabulary since the 1790’s, attempts to reach an
internationally agreed legal definition have consistently
ended in failure. The first definition, approved by the
League of Nations in 1937, was rejected by the
international community. Only 24 states signed the
relevant treaty and none ratified it.
The United Nations confined itself to concluding a
series of treaties that addressed specific categories of
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terrorist acts, such as attacks on civilian aircraft, the taking
of hostages and attacks on ships.
These UN sponsored anti-terrorist treaties share a
number of common features. They all require states to
criminalise particular offences, and promote prosecution
or extradition mechanisms to ensure that no person
suspected of having committed an offence covered by a
treaty can find refuge in the territory of another state party.
The pre-September 11 anti-terrorism conventions also
share a number of weaknesses. They have no effective
enforcement provisions. If a state refuses to abide by its
obligations under a treaty, other states cannot enforce
compliance. There is also no international court to try the
offences created by the pre-September 11 treaties in the
absence of domestic justice. Even the new International
Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction over the specific
offences created by these conventions.
There are other problems. Insufficient numbers of states
are parties to the relevant treaties. Several states, which are
considered by the West to harbour terrorists, have taken
many years to ratify anti-terrorist conventions, or simply
not signed up to them at all.
Prior to September 11, no international treaty in force
contained a general definition of terrorism, or addressed
the issue of the financial support given to terrorists or
terrorist organisations. However, change was in the wind.
The seeds of this change appeared in two General
Assembly Resolutions of 1994 (Res 49/60) and 1996 (Res
51/210). The latter Resolution calls upon all states;
“To take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate
domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist
organisations…[and] in particular to consider, where
appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to prevent and
counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for
terrorist purposes.”
Following an initiative by the French Permanent
Representative, The International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism opened for
signature at the UN in January 2000. The Financing
Convention contained, for the first time, an internationally
agreed definition of terrorism. It also contained a range of
provisions attacking the sources and means of financial
support for terrorist organisations.
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE PRE
SEPTEMBER 11
The link between terrorist and other criminal
organisations whose success and longevity depends on
financial support and laundering the proceeds of crime was
not made explicit by the FATF before September 11. The
FATF “Forty Recommendations” makes no mention of
terrorist financing, and concerns itself with “provid[ing] a
complete set of counter-measures against money
laundering covering the criminal justice system and law
enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and
international co-operation”
THE REGIONAL RESPONSE (EU) PRE
SEPTEMBER 11
The only regional treaty in force in Europe prior to
September 11 was the 1977 European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism. This Convention shares many of
the weaknesses of its international counterparts. Crucially,
it does not contain any definition of terrorism. The main
purpose of the Convention appears to have been an
attempt to strike out the effect of the political offence
exception contained in most extradition arrangements
between contracting states.
The European community’s initiatives against money
laundering were more sophisticated. The principal source
of European law on the subject before September 11 was
the 1991 EU Money Laundering Directive. The Directive
contains familiar measures to combat money laundering,
including client identification, reporting, tipping off, and
immunity from suit provisions.
European lawmakers clearly intended that whilst drug
related crimes would constitute the majority of predicate
offences in domestic law, terrorism would be included in
the designation of criminal activity in domestic legislation,
as the preamble to the Directive notes:
“since money laundering occurs not only in relation to the
proceeds of drug related offences but also in relation to the
proceeds of other criminal activities (such as organised crime
and terrorism) the member states should, within the meaning
of their legislation, extend the effects of the Directive to
include the proceeds of such activities”.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE PRE
SEPTEMBER 11
Although it is important to understand the legal and
political obstacles that have inhibited the international
peaceful response to the threat of terrorism pre-
September 11, the dynamism of international law making
should not be underestimated.
Law enforcement strategies that sought to attack the
profits of criminal enterprises are relatively recent arrivals
on the domestic as well as the international scene. The
FATF was created by the G7 in 1989. The first anti money
laundering legislation in the UK was introduced in the
same year. At that time drug trafficking, and to a lesser
extent organised crime, were the primary targets. Yet only
five years later, the UN General Assembly clearly saw the
advantage of incorporating anti money laundering and
funding strategies in the fight against international
terrorism. The EU was also beginning to recognise the
value of money laundering regulation in combating
terrorist organisations by the mid 1990’s. 21
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Tragically, it was the attacks on the WTC of September
11 that focused the attention of the international
community on the importance of enhancing existing
peaceful initiatives to combat terrorism. The fact that the
attacks could not have taken place without significant
financial support to train and maintain a large Al-Qa’ida
cell within the US, added considerable momentum to the
implementation of strategies that attack terrorist funding at
source.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE POST
SEPTEMBER 11
The UN Security Council acted with immediate effect
shortly after the September 11 attacks, issuing a number of
Resolutions dealing with both the peaceful and coercive
international response to international terrorism.
Resolution 1373 targets those who finance terrorist acts.
It requires all states to criminalise terrorist fund raising,
freeze the financial of terrorists or terrorist organisations,
and prohibit the provision of any form of economic
assistance to terrorists, terrorist organisations or related
entities. Domestic lawmakers are also required to ensure
that the financing of terrorist acts are established as serious
criminal offences in their respective jurisdictions.
The Security Council built in a novel enforcement
mechanism into the resolution. It borrowed the state
reporting and committee system from international human
rights conventions and set up a Counter Terrorism
Committee to monitor implementation of Resolution
1373. All states are obliged to report to it regularly on steps
that they have taken to implement the resolution’s provisions.
The Security Council also called upon all states to
become a party to the 1999 Financing Convention. Prior
to September 11, the Convention had only four of the 22
ratifications necessary for it to enter into force. It now has
52 parties, and has been in force since April 10 2002.
The innovations contained in the 1999 Financing
Convention are too numerous to be discussed here. In
summary it contains, for the first time, a workable
definition of terrorism, and creates an international
offence prohibiting the financing of terrorism. State parties
are obliged to change their domestic laws to make the
financing of terrorism criminal offences in their own
jurisdictions, punishable by appropriate penalties.
The 1999 Financing Convention also provides for the
freezing and forfeiture of terrorist funds, and requires that
confiscated assets should be used to compensate the
victims of terrorist acts. In addition, the 1999 Financing
Convention requires state parties to co-operation in
implementing financial regulations to include identification
and reporting provisions similar to those that appear in anti
money laundering instruments.
The success of the 1999 Financing Convention depends
on its implementation. Nonetheless, the alacrity with
which states acceded to the Convention after September
11, the binding nature of Security Council Resolution
1373, and the newly established Committee on Counter
Terrorism suggests that suppressing the finances of
terrorism has rapidly become a permanent part of the
international community’s peaceful strategy to combat the
threat of international terrorism.
THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE POST
SEPTEMBER 11
The response of the FATF to the September 11 attacks
was equally swift.
The FATF responded by producing eight “Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing” which in
combination with the earlier “Forty Recommendations”
are intended to provide an international standard for
suppressing terrorist financing. The Special
Recommendations cover familiar ground and include the
criminalisation of terrorist financing and associated money
laundering, the freezing and confiscating of terrorist assets,
international co-operation, and the reporting of suspicious
or complex transactions to national authorities.
The FATF also agreed a plan of action, in an attempt to
ensure compliance with the new recommendations, which
includes “naming and shaming” those states which fail to
take appropriate measures to combat terrorist financing,
and the provision of technical assistance to non-members.
THE REGIONAL (EU) RESPONSE POST
SEPTEMBER 11
There have been a vast number of EU initiatives since
September 11. These include political agreement on a
common definition of terrorism, increased co-operation
between member states and the EU and the United States,
and initiatives to freeze and confiscate terrorist finances.
For present purposes, the most concrete development
post September 11 is the amended money-laundering
directive, which was finally agreed on 19 November 2001.
The main changes which affect terrorist financing is the
extension of the definition of predicate offences to include
all serious crimes.
The extent of the inter-relationship between the sources
of international law discussed in this paper can be seen in
both the Amending Directive, which urges member states
to consider the FATF “Forty Recommendations” as
guidance in determining what can properly be considered
predicate offences, and the European Council Meeting in
Ghent of 19 October 2000 which urged all member states
to ratify the 1999 Financing Convention.
SOME THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Since September 11, the international community
appears to have more or less agreed what terrorism is, and
how to deal with it. An internationally agreed definition of22
Amicus Curiae Issue 47 May/June 2003
23
Amicus Curiae Issue 47 May/June 2003
A
rticle
terrorism, or at least one accepted by 52 states, has
appeared for the first time in the 1999 Financing
Convention. The Ad-Hoc Terrorism Committee of the UN
is close to producing a draft Anti-Terrorism Convention,
which will be put before the General Assembly later this
year. The European Council has adopted a common
definition of terrorism in its Framework Decision of June
13 2002. The coincidence of terminology amongst many
of the instruments, together with the exhortations
emanating from international institutions to implement
the latest conventions, suggests an unprecedented degree
of unanimity as to the appropriate peaceful strategy to
combat terrorism.
Responses to international terrorism that do not
invariably result in the deaths of innocent civilians are
popular, and certainly necessary. The strategies discussed
here are also attractive because they are a legal response to
the challenge of terrorism, expressing the collective will of
the international community, as opposed to the legally
disputed acts of individual states who use force against
others.
Having said this, the appeal of the peaceful response
discussed in this article should not blind us in any
consideration of its appropriateness. Organised crime
syndicates and drug trafficking cartels share many of the
characteristics of international terrorist organisations,
which is why innovative criminal justice strategies to
combat the former were borrowed and adapted by
international lawmakers to fight the latter. Organised
criminals and international terrorists operate across
borders, and are dependent on finance for their survival.
Their funds move from one jurisdiction to another with
bewildering speed. Their organisations are secretive, highly
disciplined and notoriously difficult to infiltrate. They
move personnel from state to state, and their impact on the
safety and security of us all is devastating.
However, there is one clear difference between these
two threats to our safety and security. Criminals are
motivated by profit, which is why domestic law
enforcement agencies believe that strategies that confiscate
the principal benefit of crime are so effective. Terrorists are
motivated by ideology, whether political, religious or
national. Those who provide financial support to terrorists
are often motivated by ideology to contribute to a cause,
but also by a sense of injustice, alienation and helplessness.
The actual sums of money involved in supporting
terrorist organisations are relatively small in any event.
Estimates vary, but it is thought that the September 11
attacks cost Al-Qa’ida less than $300,000. The transfers
were made in relatively small amounts. Making them more
difficult to detect using traditional anti-money laundering
techniques.
Also, many of the law enforcement strategies that appear
in these instruments are untried against international
terrorists, and unproven against drug traffickers and
organised crime. Such strategies carry with them
significant risks: not least the freezing and confiscation of
assets on the basis of uncorroborated intelligence and
undisclosed evidence. It may be that the real risk of relying
exclusively on such strategies is yet to emerge – that in
failing to understand and address why terrorists receive so
much financial support, the international community fails
to prevent future fund raising – which in turn facilitates the
commission of further terrorist crimes.
Finally, whilst states are signing up in large numbers to
recent conventions and initiatives to suppress terrorist
financing and improve the regulation of their fiscal systems
to prevent the laundering of terrorist funds, the real
success of the peaceful strategy discussed here will be
measured in criminal convictions and confiscated assets. To
date, the record of states in not only implementing their
international obligations, but also actually taking action
against organisations and individuals is patchy at best.
Achieving genuine international co-operation in the fight
against organised crime and drug trafficking has proved
elusive. Success in the campaign to halt the flow of funds
to international terrorists may prove even more difficult to
achieve.
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